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JOHN	  T.	  HAMILTON	  	   OMNIA	  MEA	  MECUM	  PORTO	  EXILE,	  CULTURE	  AND	  THE	  PRECARITY	  OF	  LIFE	  	  	   	  Fear	  is	  an	  education	  in	  what	  we	  are	  not,	  what	  we	  do	   not	   have,	  what	  we	   are	   supposed	   to	   care	   for	  and	  to	  care	  about,	  whose	  lack,	  or	  the	  fear	  of	  it,	  is	  so	  integral	  to	  the	  pursuit	  of	  security.	  	  Michael	  Dillon,	  Politics	  of	  Security1	  	  	  The	   fearful	   experience	   of	   exile—of	   being	   banished,	   spiritually	   or	   physically,	  voluntarily	  or	  by	  force,	  from	  one’s	  home,	  society	  and	  culture—invariably	  occasions	  reflection	  on	  the	  precarious	  conditions	  of	  existence.	  Exile	  renders	  life	  precarious	  in	  the	   strictest	   sense,	   for	   the	   term,	   derived	   from	   the	   Latin	   word	   for	   “prayer”	   or	  “entreaty”	  (prex)	  denotes	  a	  state	  that	  is	  frighteningly	  uncertain,	  fully	  dependent	  on	  the	  charitable	  will	  of	  others,	  and	  therefore	  beyond	  the	  subject’s	  control.	  A	  person’s	  situation	  is	  precarious	  when	  one	  must	  pray	  to	  another	  for	  sustenance,	  lest	  he	  or	  she	  go	   hungry,	   when	   one	   must	   beg	   for	   safekeeping,	   lest	   he	   or	   she	   suffer	   or	   perish.	  Precariousness	   points	   to	   a	   grave	   lack	   or	   loss	   that	   can	   be	   satisfied	   only	   through	  another’s	   intervention;	   it	   leaves	   someone	   existentially	   vulnerable,	   reliant	   on	  benefits	  or	  gifts	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  arrive.	  Torn	  from	  the	  usual	  contexts	  of	  support	  and	  care,	   the	  exile	   is	   set	   adrift,	   eager	   to	   land	   in	   safe	  harbor,	  where	   concerns	  over	  one’s	   livelihood,	   possessions,	   and	   health	   may	   be	   addressed.	   As	   long	   as	   these	  concerns	  remain	  unanswered,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  exile’s	  prayers	  continue	  to	  fall	  on	  deaf	  ears,	  the	  risk	  of	  insecurity	  prevails.	  	  This	   risk	   is	   a	   cause	   of	   fear	   precisely	   because	   it	   strikes	   at	   the	   very	   core	   of	  subjectivity;	  for	  the	  precariousness	  of	  exile	  reveals	  that	  the	  subject	  maintains	  but	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Michael	  Dillon,	  Politics	  of	  Security:	  Towards	  a	  Political	  Philosophy	  of	  Continental	  Thought	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1996),	  34.	  	  
	   2	  
tenuous	   relationship	   to	   the	   property	   that	   constitutes	   its	   identity,	   be	   it	   one’s	  possessions,	  one’s	  body,	  or	  one’s	  very	  own	  life.	  The	  exile	  discovers	  a	  split	  or	  even	  an	  abyss	  that	  divides	  one’s	  subjectivity	  from	  one’s	  existential	  being,	  the	  preservation	  of	  which	   is	   now	   shown	   to	   exceed	   the	   subject’s	   rational	   will.	   An	   exile’s	   being	   is	  precarious	  because	  its	  survival	  is	  out	  of	  his	  or	  her	  hands.	  	  In	   the	   most	   dismal	   of	   circumstances,	   this	   neediness	   discloses	   the	   very	  structure	  of	  the	  subject,	  whose	  genealogy	  reaches	  back	  to	  the	  category	  of	  the	  person	  developed	  both	  in	  Roman	  law	  and	  Christian	  theology.2	  Both	  traditions	  consistently	  define	  human	  being	  by	  distinguishing	  between	   its	  personal	  aspects	  and	   its	  animal	  aspects,	   whereby	   the	   personal	   is	   understood	   as	   dominating	   the	  merely	   animal.	   A	  person	   is	   a	   human	   subject,	   whose	   reason	   and	   will	   lords	   over	   the	   simple	   fact	   of	  living;	   and	   it	   is	   the	  person	  who	   thereby	   is	   accorded	   the	   civil	   rights	   and	  privileges	  that	  are	  established	  and	  protected	  by	  law.	  Juridical	  precepts	  exclusively	  involve	  the	  
persona,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  homo,	  since	  only	  the	  persona	  enjoys	  a	  legal	  status,	  since	  only	  the	  persona	  possesses	  an	  abstract	  identity	  recognized	  by	  the	  state,	  for	  example,	  the	   citizen,	   the	   father,	   the	   wife,	   the	   son,	   the	   daughter,	   and	   so	   forth.	   This	  objectification	   begins	   as	   a	   self-­‐objectification,	   insofar	   as	   the	   person	   is	   the	   subject	  who	   has	   subjected	   one’s	   animal	   being,	   someone	   who	   has	   transformed	   its	   living	  existence	  into	  a	  property.	  As	  the	  medieval	  theorists	  affirmed,	  one	  is	  born	  as	  a	  human	  being,	   but	   one	   becomes	   a	   person—homo	   naturae,	   persona	   iuris	   civilis	   vocabulum	  (“man	   is	   a	   term	   of	   nature,	   person	   is	   a	   term	   of	   civil	   law”);	   and	   it	   is	   precisely	   this	  definition	  of	  personhood	  as	  a	  civil,	  legal	  imputation	  which	  is	  perpetuated	  in	  modern	  liberalism.3	  In	   extremely	   precarious	   cases,	   the	   exile	   is	   depersonalized,	   reduced	   to	  animal	   conditions,	   praying	   for	   legal	   recognition,	   begging	   for	   renewed	   legal	   status,	  which	  would	  ensure	  that	  one’s	  life	  is	  once	  again	  regarded	  as	  one’s	  rightful	  property.	  Until	   that	   moment,	   the	   exile	   suffers	   an	   expropriation,	   incapable	   of	   self-­‐transcendence	  and	  therefore	  outside	  the	  law.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  This	  genealogy	  is	  fully	  traced	  in	  Roberto	  Esposito,	  Third	  Person:	  Politics	  of	  Life	  and	  Philosophy	  of	  the	  
Impersonal,	  Z.	  Hanafi,	  trans.	  (Cambridge:	  Polity,	  2012),	  64–103.	  	  3	  Donellus	  (1517–91),	  cited	  in	  Esposito,	  Third	  Person,	  81.	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In	   contrast	   to	   the	   abstract,	   quasi-­‐immaterial	   concept	   of	   the	   person,	   the	  experience	   of	   the	   refugee	   is	   highly	   concrete.	   No	   longer	   capable	   of	   enjoying	   the	  resources	  and	  assistance	  that	  one	  generally	  finds	  at	  home—among	  family	  members	  or	   within	   one’s	   community,	   from	   familiar	   settings	   and	   from	   dependable	  institutions—the	   banished	   subject	   generally	   prays	   for	   a	   new	   familiarity,	   a	   new	  community,	  a	  new	  culture—institutions	  that	  would	  recognize	  and	  therefore	  restore	  the	   subject’s	   personhood.	  Assimilation	   to	   fresh	   surroundings,	   adopting	   a	   different	  culture,	  would	  provide	  the	  ground	  for	  a	  new	  sustainable	  life	  and	  confirm	  the	  path	  to	  re-­‐appropriation.	  Yet,	   locating	  a	  fresh	  supportive	  network	  has	  never	  been	  the	  only	  option	   open	   to	   exiles	   or,	   for	   that	   matter,	   to	   immigrants,	   whose	   circumstances	  frequently	  recall	  the	  plight	  of	  exile.	  One	  alternative	  course,	  feasible	  or	  not,	  would	  be	  to	   take	   along	   one’s	   familiar	   culture,	   to	   transport	   the	   conditions	   of	   home	   into	   the	  foreign	   dwelling.	   Rather	   than	   pray	   for	   external	   support,	   the	   subject	   could	   turn	  inward,	  drawing	   sustenance	   from	   the	   culture	   that	   is	   lodged	  within.	  The	  exile	   thus	  remedies	  the	  precarious	  consequences	  of	  having	  been	  uprooted,	  of	  having	  been	  cut	  off	   from	   one’s	   home,	   by	   bringing	   the	   home	   culture	   along.	   In	   other	   words,	   by	  transporting	   one’s	   culture	   as	   one’s	   rightful	   property,	   the	   subject	   perpetuates	   its	  status	  as	  a	  person,	  regardless	  of	  the	  new	  legal	  context.	  	  Perhaps	   the	  most	   noteworthy	   expression	   of	   this	   line	   of	   action	   comes	   from	  Thomas	  Mann.	  On	  the	  morning	  of	  February	  21,	  1938,	  as	  he	  disembarked	  from	  the	  
Queen	  Mary	   in	   New	   York	   Harbor,	   reporters	   asked	   the	   renowned	   Nobel	   laureate,	  “Whether	  he	  found	  his	  exile	  a	  difficult	  burden”:	  “It	   is	  hard	  to	  bear,”	  he	  admitted,	  “but	  what	  makes	   it	  easier	   is	  the	  realization	  of	  the	  poisoned	  atmosphere	  in	  Germany.	  That	  makes	  it	  easier	  because	  it’s	  actually	  no	  loss.	  Where	  I	  am,	  there	  is	  Germany.	  I	  carry	  my	  German	  culture	  in	  me.	  I	  have	  contact	  with	  the	  world	  and	  I	  do	  not	  consider	  myself	  fallen.”4	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  “Mann	  Finds	  US	  Sole	  Peace	  Hope,”	  New	  York	  Times	  (February	  22,	  1938),	  13.	  The	  German	  version	  is	  found	   among	   Mann’s	   papers:	   “Es	   ist	   schwer	   zu	   ertragen.	   Aber	   was	   es	   leichter	   macht,	   ist	   die	  Vergegenwärtigung	  der	  vergifteten	  Atmosphäre,	  die	  in	  Deutschland	  herrscht.	  Das	  macht	  es	  leichter,	  weil	  man	  in	  Wirklichkeit	  nichts	  verliert.	  Wo	  ich	  bin,	  ist	  Deutschland.	  Ich	  trage	  meine	  deutsche	  Kultur	  in	  mir.	  Ich	  lebe	  im	  Kontakt	  mit	  der	  Welt	  und	  ich	  betrachte	  mich	  selbst	  nicht	  als	  gefallenen	  Menschen.”	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Mann’s	   declaration,	   despite	   its	   optimism,	   does	   not	   neglect	   the	   pain	   of	   exile.	  Marginalized	  and	  then	  excluded	  by	  the	  nation	  of	  his	  birth,	  the	  famous	  author	  tersely	  acknowledges	  his	  difficulties:	  “It	   is	  hard	  to	  bear.”	  Unlike	  ordinary	  travelers,	  whose	  luggage	  contains	  items	  needed	  or	  desired	  for	  a	  temporary	  sojourn	  away	  from	  home,	  Mann,	  specifically	  as	  an	  exile,	  carries	  an	  additional	  burden	  that	   instead	  consists	   in	  deprivation.	   He	   is	   loaded	   down	   not	   with	   possessions	   but	   rather	   by	   the	   fact	   of	  dispossession.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  lightness	  of	  his	  baggage	  is	  inversely	  proportionate	  to	  the	  weight	  of	  his	  encumbrances.	  The	  less	  he	  carries,	  the	  more	  he	  has	  to	  bear	  as	  loss.	  	  Six	   days	   before,	   when	   he	   left	   Cherbourg	  with	   his	   wife	   Katja	   and	   their	   son	  Michael,	  Mann	   only	   vaguely	   flirted	  with	   the	   idea	   of	   remaining	   long	   in	   the	   United	  States.	   It	  was	   his	   fourth	   trip	   to	   America	   and,	   like	  Hans	   Castorp,	   the	   unsuspecting	  hero	   of	   The	  Magic	  Mountain,	   he	   initially	   had	   little	   intention	   of	   an	   extended	   stay,	  planning	   instead	   to	   attend	   the	   opening	   of	   the	   Thomas	   Mann	   Collection	   at	   Yale	  University,	   followed	   by	   a	   swift	   cross-­‐country	   lecture	   tour.	   His	   bags	   were	   packed	  accordingly,	  including	  sufficient	  clothing	  and	  some	  manuscripts	  of	  current	  works-­‐in-­‐progress.	  Otherwise,	  all	  else	  was	  left	  behind.	  Yet	  already	  on	  the	  ocean	  liner	  reports	  had	  been	  received	  of	  Hitler’s	  accelerated	  advance	  to	  annex	  Austria	  and	  “reclaim”	  the	  Sudeten	   German	   lands.	   The	   threat	   of	   Nazi	   expansion	   cast	   its	   shadow	   on	   the	  celebrated	   author’s	   first	   days	   in	   New	   York,	   where	   the	   idea	   of	   emigration	   would	  gradually	  assume	  greater	  urgency.	  His	  American	  publisher,	  Alfred	  A.	  Knopf,	  tried	  to	  dispel	   the	  dire	  mood	  by	  providing	  quiet	  dinners,	  cozy	  rooms	  at	  the	  Hotel	  Bedford,	  and	   tickets	   to	   the	   Booth	   Theater	   for	   a	   performance	   of	   Kaufman	   and	   Hart’s	   hit	  comedy	  You	  Can’t	  Take	  it	  With	  You.5	  The	  play’s	  title	  would	  hardly	  have	  been	  lost	  on	  the	  seasoned	  ironist.	  	  Facing	  the	  reporters	  on	  the	  gangplank	  in	  New	  York,	  Mann	  starkly	  admits	  that	  exile	   is	   a	   difficult	   burden	   to	   bear,	   but	   then,	   without	   hesitation,	   he	   immediately	  converts	   his	   victimhood	   into	   a	   victory.	   He	   adroitly	   picks	   up	   on	   the	   newsman’s	  prompt	  and	  effects	  a	  transcendence	  based	  on	  a	  crucial	  negation:	  what	  he	  has	  lost	  is	  in	  fact	  “no	  loss.”	  The	  burden	  of	  exile	  is	  not	  really	  a	  burden	  because	  the	  Germany	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  See	  Donald	  Prater,	  Thomas	  Mann:	  A	  Life	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1995),	  275.	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he	   has	   left	   behind	   is	   not	   truly	   Germany.	   Rather,	   the	   eternal	   virtues	   and	   values	   of	  “German	   culture”	   are	   borne	   within,	   having	   been	   transported	   across	   the	   Atlantic,	  safely	   stored	   in	   the	   writer’s	   very	   being.	   	   “Where	   I	   am,	   there	   is	   Germany.”	   This	  proprietary	  claim	  can	  be	  and	  has	  been	  interpreted	  in	  at	   least	  two	  ways.6	  For	  those	  who	  detect	  inclinations	  to	  megalomania	  in	  the	  author,	  Mann	  appears	  to	  overburden	  himself	  with	  the	  responsibility	  of	  representing	  his	  nation	  to	  the	  “world.”	  Critics	  thus	  denounce	  Mann’s	  inflated	  estimation	  of	  his	  representative	  role,	  his	  belief	  that	  he	  and	  he	  alone	  could	  embody	  the	  entirety	  of	  German	  culture.	   Is	  German	  culture	  any	   less	  present	  where	  Theodor	  Adorno	  now	  lives,	  where	  Hannah	  Arendt,	  Hermann	  Broch,	  Erwin	  Panofsky,	  Albert	  Einstein,	  and	  countless	  other	  writers,	  artists,	  scientists,	  and	  politicians	  now	  dwell?	  What	  gives	  Thomas	  Mann	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  speak	  for	  the	  values	  and	  ideals	  of	  an	  entire	  national	  tradition?	  	  That	   said,	   in	   the	   view	   of	   more	   generous	   interpreters,	   Mann	   is	   hardly	  presenting	  himself	   as	   the	   incarnation	  of	  German	   culture,	   but	   rather	   is	  making	   the	  much	  more	  humble	  claim	  that	  he	  can	  console	  himself	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  he	   is	  able	  to	  retain	  what	   he	   has	   inherited	   from	   his	   education,	   that	   the	   artistic	   and	   intellectual	  traditions,	  which	  had	  always	  motivated	  and	  sustained	  his	  work,	   is	  property	  still	   in	  his	  possession,	  that	  this	  legacy	  is	  still	  readily	  accessible.	  Accordingly,	  when	  Heinrich	  Mann	   records	   his	   brother’s	   claim	   in	   his	   memoir,	   Ein	   Zeitalter	   wird	   besichtigt,	   he	  glosses	  it	  with	  a	  verse	  from	  Goethe’s	  Faust,	  “Was	  Du	  ererbt	  von	  Deinen	  Vätern	  hast	  /	  erwirb	  es,	  um	  es	  zu	  besitzen”	  (“What	  you	  have	  inherited	  from	  your	  fathers	  /	  acquire	  it,	  in	  order	  to	  possess	  it,”	  v.	  682–83).7	  Heinrich	  Mann	  specifically	  refers	  to	  the	  “ideas	  and	   opinions,	   images	   and	   faces”	   (“Vorstellungen	   und	   Meinungen,	   Bildern	   und	  Gesichten”)	   that	   the	   artist	   bears	   in	   his	   soul—material	   that	   is	   “no	   longer	   bound	   to	  any	   nation”	   (“an	   keine	   Nation	   mehr	   gebunden”),	   like	   the	   immortal,	   transcendent	  lines	   of	   Goethe’s	   tragedy	   that	   occasions	   this	   very	   reflection.	   A	   culture	   that	   is	   no	  longer	   bound	   to	   its	   territorial	   origin	   is	   a	   legacy	   that	   has	   undergone	   a	   certain	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  For	  an	  overview,	  see	  Helmut	  Koopmann,	  “Lotte	  in	  Amerika,	  Thomas	  Mann	  in	  Weimar,”	   in	  Wagner,	  
Nietzsche,	  Thomas	  Mann:	  Festschrift	  für	  Eckhard	  Heftrich,	  H.	  Gockel,	  M.	  Neumann,	  and	  R.	  Wimmer,	  ed.	  (Frankfurt	  a.M.:	  Klostermann,	  1993),	  324–42.	  	  7	  Heinrich	  Mann,	  Ein	  Zeitalter	  wird	  besichtigt	   (Berlin:	   Aufbau,	   1982),	   215.	   Cf.	   Koopmann,	   “Lotte	   in	  Amerika,”	  324.	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abstraction	   or	   dematerialization,	   a	   process	   that	   is	   analogous	   to	   and	   in	   fact	  concomitant	  with	  the	  abstraction	  of	  personhood.	  	  In	  this	  regard,	  Thomas	  Mann	  hardly	  exhibits	  delusions	  of	  grandeur.	  Instead,	  like	   many	   of	   his	   compatriots,	   he	   sees	   German	   culture	   on	   the	   brink	   of	   total	  asphyxiation,	   poisoned	  by	   the	   lethal	   atmosphere	   of	   fascism.	  His	   views	   are	   thus	   in	  line	  with	  general	  efforts	  among	  those	  driven	  out	  by	  the	  Nazi	  regime.	  Ever	  since	  the	  seizure	  of	  power	  in	  1933,	  resistant	  movements	  emerged	  to	  redeem	  German	  culture	  from	  fascist	  perversion	  and	  oppression.	  In	  1935	  Heinrich	  Mann	  himself	  opened	  an	  impressively	   large	   congress,	   the	   International	   Union	   of	   Writers,	   with	   a	   speech	  entitled	  “Die	  Verteidigung	  der	  Kultur”	  (“The	  Defense	  of	  Culture”),	  which	  calls	  upon	  exiles	  to	  take	  their	  culture	  with	  them	  for	  safekeeping.	  Thomas	  Mann,	  as	  well,	  would	  work	  with	  figures	  like	  Peter	  de	  Mendelssohn	  to	  establish	  a	  “Deutsche	  Akademie	  in	  New	   York”	   and	   participate	   in	   the	   founding	   of	   the	   “American	   Guild	   for	   German	  Cultural	   Freedom,”	   pleading	   “for	   free	   German	   cultural	   life	   beyond	   the	   Reich’s	  borders”	   (“für	   das	   freie	   deutsche	   Kulturleben	   außerhalb	   der	   Reichsgrenzen”).8	  Deterritorialized,	  German	  culture	  is	  now	  transportable.	  The	  true	  Germany	  has	  itself	  emigrated	  from	  a	  false	  Germany.	  	  Thomas	  Mann’s	  attempts	  to	  defend	  German	  culture,	  already	  indicated	  in	  his	  gangplank	   interview,	   imply	   that	   this	   heritage	   is	   under	   threat	   of	   complete	  obliteration.	  He	  thus	  remedies	  his	  precarious	  circumstances	  not	  only	  by	  bearing	  his	  cultural	   support	   system	   within,	   but	   also	   by	   depicting	   Germany	   itself	   in	   the	  precarious	  situation	  of	  exile.	  The	  nation	  of	  his	  birth	  now	  depends	  on	  him.	  To	  retain	  its	  true	  value,	  Germany	  must	  pray	  to	  him.	  This	  kind	  of	  reversal	  is	  common	  enough:	  someone	   in	   a	   vulnerable	   position	   prevents	   further	   wounding	   by	   wounding	   the	  threatening	  other.	  On	  a	  fundamental,	  nearly	  physiological	   level,	  Mann	  reacts	  to	  his	  predicament	  by	  fleeing	  and	  by	  retaliating.	  To	  be	  sure,	  this	  flight-­‐and-­‐fight	  response	  offers	   but	   an	   emotional	   consolation	   in	   the	   face	   of	   continued	   difficulties.	   It	   is	  somewhat	   reminiscent	   of	   what	   Diderot	   identified	   as	   the	   esprit	   de	   l’escalier—the	  “staircase	  wit”	  that	  furnishes	  the	  perfect	  retort	  only	  after	  one	  has	  taken	  leave	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Thomas	  Mann	  (1938),	  Gesammelte	  Werke	  11:	  942.	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adversary.	  From	  a	  political	  realist	  perspective,	  Mann’s	  personal	  denunciation	  of	  the	  Nazi	   regime,	   however	   significant	   and	   well	   broadcasted,	   however	   much	   it	   might	  sustain	   and	   even	   organize	   collective	   support	   among	   the	   growing	   community	   of	  refugees,	  would	  remain	  purely	  symbolic,	  at	  least	  until	  it	  could	  inspire	  and	  motivate	  a	  deadly,	   military	   response,	   capable	   of	   dismantling	   the	   fascist	   machine	   of	   war	   and	  murder.	   And	   certainly,	   the	   lives	   of	   millions,	   including	   the	   life	   of	   Thomas	   Mann,	  would	   continue	   to	  be	  precarious	   to	   varying	  degrees,	   until	   that	  moment	  when	   this	  formidable	  menace	   was	   definitively	   decimated.	   Since	   the	   time	   of	   Machiavelli	   and	  Hobbes,	  political	  realism	  has	  always	  insisted	  that	  the	  security	  of	  one	  party	  depends	  on	   the	   insecurity	   of	   the	   other,	   that	   the	   cure	   for	   impotence	   is	   always	   increased	  power.	  	  All	  the	  same,	  Thomas	  Mann’s	  portside	  pronouncement	  can	  hardly	  be	  limited	  or	  reduced	  to	  a	  political	  realist	  prescription	  for	  the	  maximization	  of	  power.	  Instead,	  it	  rests	  on	  the	  dual	  presupposition	  that	  something	  like	  cultural	  heritage	  exists	  and	  that	  it	  is	  somehow	  transportable.	  “I	  carry	  my	  German	  culture	  in	  me.”	  In	  addition	  to	  being	  transported	  across	  the	  Atlantic	  on	  the	  Queen	  Mary,	  Thomas	  Mann	  himself	  acts	  as	  a	  stalwart	  vessel,	   freighted	  with	  what	  he	  regards	  as	  his	  nation’s	  timeless	  values	  and	  accomplishments.	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  these	  goods	  are	  now	  viewed	  as	  caught	  in	   a	   highly	   precarious	   situation.	   Like	   an	   assiduous	   proprietor,	   Thomas	   Mann	  protects	   the	   cultural	   assets	   that	   in	   turn	   protect	   his	   personal	   status	   as	   an	  internationally	   acclaimed	   author	   with	   a	   singular	   voice:	   “I	   have	   contact	   with	   the	  world	  and	  do	  not	  consider	  myself	  fallen.”	  	  In	  brief,	  Thomas	  Mann	  remains	  upright	  by	   securing	   the	  cultural	  goods	   that	  secure	  his	  own	  personhood.	  Yet,	  although	  security	  works	   to	  assure	  his	  status,	   this	  kind	  of	  securitization	  cannot	  evade	  another,	  perhaps	  more	  insidious	  threat,	  namely	  the	   threat	   of	   complacency.	   If	   security	   spells	   the	   removal	   of	   care—se-­‐cura—it	  invariably	  entails	  a	  promise	  as	  well	  as	  a	  peril,	  an	  existence	  that	  may	  be	  carefree	  but	  may	  also	  be	  careless.	   In	  an	  essay	  published	  only	  two	  months	  after	  Thomas	  Mann’s	  arrival	  to	  New	  York,	  Walter	  Benjamin	  reflected	  on	  the	  nomadic	  state	  of	  the	  German	  intelligentsia	   and	   the	   tendency,	   among	   liberal	   thinkers,	   to	   promulgate	   the	   idea	   of	  German	  culture	  heritage	  (Kulturerbe):	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Das	   ist	   angesichts	   des	   Zynismus	   verständlich,	   mit	   dem	   die	   deutsche	   Geschichte	  zurzeit	   geschrieben,	   deutsche	   Habe	   zurzeit	   verwaltet	   wird.	   Aber	   es	   wäre	   nichts	  gewonnen,	  wenn	  auf	  der	  andern	  Seite	  unter	  den	  drinnen	  Schweigenden	  oder	  denen,	  die	  draußen	  das	  Wort	  für	  sie	  führen	  dürfen,	  die	  Süffisanz	  der	  Erbberechtigten	  sich	  hervortäte,	  der	  Bettlerstolz	  eines	  andern	  omnia	  mea	  mecum	  porto	  zum	  guten	  Ton	  würde.	  Denn	  die	  geistigen	  Besitztümer	  sind	  derzeit	  um	  nichts	  besser	  gewährleistet	  als	  die	  materiellen.	  	  	  This	   is	   understandable,	   in	   view	   of	   the	   cynicism	   with	   which	   German	   history	   is	  currently	   being	  written	   and	  German	  property	   currently	   administered.	   Yet	  nothing	  would	  be	   gained	   if,	   among	   those	  who	  are	   silent	   inside	  Germany	  or	   those	  who	  are	  able	  to	  speak	  for	  them	  outside,	  the	  complacency	  of	  would-­‐be	  inheritors	  were	  given	  free	   rein,	   or	   if	   the	  beggarly	  boast	   “Omnia	  mea	  mecum	  porto”	  were	   to	  become	   the	  accepted	   tone.	   For	   these	   days,	   intellectual	   possessions	   are	   no	   more	   secure	   than	  material	  ones.9	  	  The	  text	  is	  from	  the	  concluding	  paragraph	  of	  a	  short	  piece	  that	  Benjamin	  wrote	  on	  the	   significance	   of	   the	   exiled	   Frankfurt	   School,	   which,	   in	   his	   opinion,	   laudably	  maintains	   a	   critical	   approach	   to	   culture	   rather	   than	   relying	   on	   an	   affirmative,	  unquestioned	   concept	   of	   culture.	   Entitled	   Ein	   deutsches	   Institut	   freier	   Forschung,	  Benjamin’s	   article	   appreciatively	   acknowledges	   the	   encouragement	   and	   real	  financial	   support	   that	   German	   refugees	   have	   received	   in	   the	   world’s	   “great	  democracies,”	  with	   the	   Institute	  of	  Social	  Research	  at	  Columbia	  University	   in	  New	  York	   and	   the	   Institut	   des	  Recherches	   Sociales	   at	   the	  École	  Normale	   Supérieure	   in	  Paris;	   yet,	   the	   social	   efficacy	   of	   these	   establishments	   depends	   on	   an	   undaunted	  willingness	   to	   interrogate	   cultural	   products.	   For	   Benjamin,	   preserving	   cultural	  heritage	  is	  meaningless	  if	  such	  preservation	  involves	  protecting	  these	  works,	  values,	  and	   ideals	   from	   all	   manners	   of	   assault.	   The	   precariousness	   of	   culture	   cannot	   be	  taken	  as	  an	  excuse	  for	  keeping	  culture	  safe	  from	  critique.	  By	  regarding	  one’s	  culture	  as	  some	  inalienable	  property,	  one	  risks	  falling	  into	  complacency.	  	  	   Benjamin’s	   article	   appeared	   in	   the	   Swiss	   journal	  Maß	  und	  Wert,	   edited	   by	  Ferdinand	   Lion,	   a	   long-­‐time	   personal	   friend	   of	   Thomas	   Mann,	   who	   regularly	  contributed	  to	  the	  journal.	  It	  is	  therefore	  most	  probable	  that	  Benjamin’s	  reference	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Walter	   Benjamin,	   “Ein	   deutsches	   Institut	   freier	   Forschung”	   (1938),	   in	   Gesammelte	   Schriften,	   R.	  Tiedemann	   and	   H.	   Schweppenhäuser,	   ed.	   (Frankfurt	   a.	   M.:	   Suhrkamp,	   1991),	   3:	   525.	   [“A	   German	  Institute	   for	   Independent	   Research,”	   in	   Selected	   Writings,	   vol.	   3,	   H.	   Eiland	   and	   M.	   Jennings,	   ed.	  (Cambridge:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  2002),	  312].	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the	  “beggarly	  boast”	  was	  directly	  targeted	  at	  the	  famous	  author’s	  comment	  in	  New	  York	   Harbor,	   which	   had	   already	   been	   widely	   disseminated	   among	   the	   German	  communities	  in	  exile.	  For	  Benjamin,	  Mann’s	  claim,	  that	  he	  carries	  German	  culture	  in	  him,	  unmistakably	  recalls	  the	  Latin	  dictum	  omnia	  mea	  mecum	  porto,	  “I	  carry	  all	  my	  things	  with	  me.”	  Although	  Benjamin	  can	  partially	  condone	  the	  sentiment,	  insofar	  as	  it	  has	  traditionally	  expressed	  philosophical	  triumph	  in	  the	  face	  of	  adversity,	  it	  rests	  on	  a	  number	  of	  presuppositions	  that	  Benjamin	  would	  certainly	  want	  to	  challenge,	  in	  particular,	   the	  manner	   of	   dematerialization	   and	   abstraction,	  which	   is	   prerequisite	  for	   culture’s	   transportability.	   In	   linking	   the	  phrase	  omnia	  mea	  mecum	  porto	  to	   the	  idea	  of	  “intellectual	  possessions”	  (geistige	  Besitztümer),	  Benjamin	  calls	  attention	  to	  the	   idealism	  that	  has	  always	  motivated	   its	  usage.	  Variably	  attested	   in	  a	  number	  of	  ancient	   sources,	   the	   dictum	   does	   indeed	   appear	   to	   summarize	   an	   especially	   Stoic	  denunciation	  of	  materiality.	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  vivid	  instances	  comes	  from	  the	  versified	  fable	  that	  Phaedrus	  wrote	   about	   the	   Greek	   poet	   Simonides.10 	  The	   poem’s	   opening	   line	   declares	   a	  straightforward	   moral:	   “The	   learned	   man	   always	   has	   riches	   in	   himself”	   (Homo	  
doctus	   in	  se	  semper	  divitias	  habet).	  The	   story	   then	   introduces	  Simonides,	   the	  great	  lyric	  poet,	  who	  overcame	  poverty	  by	  traveling	  across	  Asia	  Minor,	  composing	  victory	  songs	  for	  an	  agreed	  wage	  in	  hard	  coin.	  After	  amassing	  a	  sizeable	  fortune,	  Simonides	  boarded	   a	   ship	   to	   take	   him	   to	   his	   home	  on	   the	   island	   of	   Ceos;	   but	   a	   rough	   storm	  broke	  out	  and	  instantly	  destroyed	  the	  old	  vessel.	  Some	  of	  the	  passengers	  frantically	  grabbed	  their	  purses	  and	  precious	  jewels,	  but	  Simonides	  took	  nothing,	  proclaiming,	  “All	  my	  things	  are	  with	  me”	  (Mecum	  mea	  sunt	  cuncta	  [14]).	  Only	  a	  few	  were	  able	  to	  swim	  away	   loaded	  down	  with	  material	   things;	   and	   those	  who	  managed	   to	   escape	  death	  unexpectedly	  encountered	  pirates,	  who	  subsequently	  robbed	  them	  of	  all	  their	  possessions.	  Ultimately,	  the	  survivors,	  including	  Simonides,	  landed	  on	  the	  shores	  of	  Clezomenai.	  A	   great	   lover	  of	   literature	   immediately	   recognized	   the	   famed	  poet	  by	  his	   voice	   and	   proceeded	   to	   supply	   him	   with	   clothing,	   money	   and	   servants.	   The	  others,	   stripped	   of	   everything,	   desperately	   tried	   to	   collect	   alms	   by	   displaying	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Phaedrus,	  Fabula	  4:	  21,	  “De	  Simonide.”	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drawing	   of	   a	   shipwreck	   on	   tablets.	   When	   Simonides	   saw	   his	   poor	   shipmates,	   he	  admonished	  them:	  “I	  said	  that	  all	  my	  things	  are	  with	  me;	  what	  you	  took	  along	  has	  already	  come	  to	  nothing”	  (Dixi	  …	  mea	  /	  mecum	  esse	  cuncta;	  vos	  quod	  rapuistis	  perit	  [26–27]).	  	  The	  difference	  between	  Simonides,	  who	  jumps	  overboard	  with	  nothing,	  and	  his	   shipmates,	   who	   grab	  whatever	   is	   in	   reach,	   illustrates	   the	   distinction	   between	  two	   economic	   systems.	   As	   Phaedrus’s	   fable	   indicates,	   Simonides	   was	   frequently	  accredited	   with	   being	   the	   first	   poet	   who	   sold	   his	   work	   for	  money,	   precisely	   at	   a	  moment	   in	   history	   when	   earlier,	   aristocratic	   methods	   of	   gift-­‐giving	   and	   material	  exchange	   were	   being	   supplanted	   by	   coinage.	   Whereas	   the	   anonymous	   crewmen	  hope	   to	   subsist	   on	   bartering,	   trading	   their	   goods—precious	   jewels	   or	   poignant	  drawings—for	  food,	  Simonides	  understands	  that	  his	  voice	  alone	  possesses	  value	  as	  a	  producer	  of	  desirable	  poetry.11	  Everyone	  on	  board	   faced	   the	  precarious	  event	  of	  shipwreck,	  yet	  only	  one	  managed	  to	  regain	  his	  losses.	  	  The	   insufficiency	   of	   material	   goods	   again	   furnishes	   the	   theme	   in	   Cicero’s	  employment	   of	   the	   phrase,	   which	   he	   attributes	   to	   Bias	   of	   Priene,	   one	   of	   the	  legendary	  Seven	  Sages.	  When	  his	  town	  was	  being	  invaded,	  all	  struggled	  to	  flee	  with	  as	  many	   possessions	   as	   they	   could	   bear;	   Bias	   alone	  walked	   away	  with	   nothing.	   A	  neighbor	   urgently	   advised	   the	   philosopher	   to	   grab	   his	   belongings,	   but	   he	   calmly	  replied:	   “I’m	  doing	  so,	   for	   I	  carry	  all	  my	  things	  with	  me”	  (facio,	  nam	  omnia	  mecum	  
porto	  mea).12	  The	   contents	   of	   a	   sagacious	   mind	   cannot	   be	   pillaged	   or	   destroyed.	  Mental	   portage	   is	   clearly	   a	   benefit	   in	   this	  mutable,	   contingent,	   and	   violent	  world.	  The	   same	   lesson	   is	   underscored	   by	   Valerius	   Maximus	   who,	   in	   his	   version	   of	   the	  story,	  explains	  that	  Bias	  escaped	  with	  everything	  “in	  his	  heart,	  not	  on	  his	  shoulders,	  things	  not	  to	  be	  seen	  with	  the	  eyes	  but	  valued	  by	  the	  spirit	   [nec	  oculis	  visenda,	  sed	  
aestimanda	  animo].”13	  The	   learned	  man	  understood	   the	  value	  of	   the	   spirit	   and	   the	  disposability	   of	   the	   physical.	   As	   long	   as	   one	   is	   able	   to	   detach	   goods	   and	   carry	  (portare)	  them	  in	  one’s	  mind,	  they	  remain	  invulnerable	  to	  damage	  or	  loss.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Anne	   Carson	   reflects	   at	   length	   on	   Simonides’	   role	   in	   the	   move	   toward	   a	   monetary	   system	   in	  
Economy	  of	  the	  Unlost	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1999),	  10–27.	  	  12	  Cicero,	  Paradoxa	  Stoicorum	  1.1.8.	  	  13	  Valerius	  Maximus,	  7.2.	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Physical	   objects	   are	   forever	   at	   risk,	   liable	   to	   damage,	   loss,	   or	   theft,	   while	  objects	   secured	   in	   the	  mind	   are	   far	   less	   vulnerable	   and	   even	   approach	   a	   kind	   of	  immortality.	   This	   accomplishment,	   the	   result	   of	   discipline,	   exercises,	   and	  meditation,	  greatly	  attracted	  the	  Roman	  Stoics	  of	  the	  Imperial	  period.	  Thus,	  Seneca	  relates	   the	  same	  story,	  now	  concerning	   the	  philosopher	  Stilbo,	  who	   lost	  his	  home,	  wife	  and	  children	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  Demetrius,	  the	  notorious	  destroyer	  of	  cities.	  This	  terrifying	   general	   arrived	   to	   taunt	   the	  wise	  man	   by	   asking	   if	   he	   lost	   anything,	   to	  which	  he	  replied:	  	  “All	   my	   goods	   are	   with	   me”	   [omnia	   bona	   mea	   mecum	   sunt].	   Behold	   the	   man	   strong	   and	  vigorous!	  He	  was	  victorious	  over	  the	  very	  victory	  of	  his	  enemy.	  “I	  have	  lost	  nothing,”	  he	  said;	  and	  made	  [Demetrius]	  doubt	  whether	  he	  had	  actually	  conquered.	  “All	  of	  my	  things	  are	  with	  me”	   [omnia	  mea	  mecum	   sunt]:	   justice,	   virtue,	   prudence—the	   very	   fact	   that	   he	   considered	  nothing	  good	  that	  could	  be	  taken	  away.14	  	  As	  in	  the	  Simonides	  story,	  perishability	  signals	  a	  lack	  of	  value.	  Culture	  is	  what	  can	  be	  
imported	   into	   the	   mind,	   that	   which	   is	   not	   bound	   or	   restricted	   by	   the	   material	  conditions	  of	  production.	  Having	  studied	  the	  great	  works	  of	  moral	  philosophy,	  Stilbo	  is	  no	  longer	  in	  need	  of	  the	  unwieldy	  scrolls.	  Because	  the	  content	  is	  detachable	  from	  the	   parchment	   or	   paper,	   the	   tyrant	   poses	   no	   real	   threat.	   For	   Thomas	  Mann,	  who	  carries	  German	  culture	  in	  him,	  for	  the	  Nobel	  Laureate,	  who	  recognizes	  himself	  as	  a	  producer	   of	   literature	   endowed	   with	   value,	   culture	   can	   pass	   through	   precarious	  circumstances	   unscathed	   insofar	   as	   it	   is	   essentially	   spiritual,	   non-­‐material.	   Yet,	   as	  Benjamin	  in	  horrifying	  concision	  underscores,	  “These	  days,	  intellectual	  possessions	  are	  no	  more	  secure	  than	  material	  ones.”	  	  Thanks	   to	   his	   belief	   in	   the	   culture’s	   basic	   detachability	   from	   its	   material	  provenance,	  Thomas	  Mann,	  arriving	  into	  New	  York,	  can	  transform	  his	  exile	  into	  an	  
opportunity.	  An	  opportunity	   implies	  a	  convenient	  or	  promising	  time	  for	  entering	  a	  new	  phase	  in	  life,	  a	  moment	  when	  one	  literally	  stands	  “before	  the	  port”	  (ob-­‐portus)	  that	   leads	   from	   one	   place	   to	   the	   next.	   The	  opportune	  moment	   evokes	   the	   harbor,	  recalling	  the	  point	  of	  embarkation	  where	  one	  can	  bear	  (portare)	  goods	  to	  profitable	  ends.	  In	  Latin,	  the	  adjective	  opportunus	  originally	  described	  a	  favorable	  wind	  in	  the	  harbor,	  gesturing	  to	  Portunus,	  the	  god	  who	  watched	  over	  ports	  and	  whose	  temple	  at	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Seneca,	  Epistle	  9.18–19	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Rome	  was	  erected	   in	   the	  Forum	  Boarium	  near	   the	  bend	   in	   the	  Tiber	  where	   cargo	  barges	  arrived	  to	  and	  from	  the	  city.	  The	  opportunist	  is	  always	  prepared	  to	  close	  the	  door	   (porta)	  on	  one	  part	  of	   life	   in	  order	   to	  open	   the	  door	  onto	  another.	  The	   fresh	  overture	   is	   premised	   on	   a	   closure.	   Benjamin,	   however,	   reminds	   us	   that	   keeping	  cultural	   value	   safe	   in	   transport,	   although	   beneficial	   to	   the	   individual	   bourgeois	  writer,	  gains	  nothing	  for	  society	  at	   large,	  especially	   for	  those	  trapped	  on	  the	  other	  side	   of	   the	   closed	   door.	   In	   redeeming	   culture	   from	   precariousness,	   a	   general	  precarity	   persists.	   As	   history	   would	   have	   it,	   the	   winds	   that	   proved	   favorable	   for	  Thomas	  Mann	  at	  the	  Port	  of	  New	  York	  would	  not	  blow	  as	  benignly	  for	  Benjamin	  at	  the	  Catalonian	  border	  town	  of	  Portbou.	  	  	  Needless	  to	  say,	  the	  conclusion	  of	  World	  War	  II	  did	  nothing	  to	  end	  the	  horrific	  peril	  of	  many	   lives.	  Even	  after	   the	  Nazi’s	  program	  of	  expropriating	  and	  depersonalizing	  entire	  populations	  had	  been	  brought	  to	  a	  halt,	  the	  consequences	  would	  continue	  to	  be	   felt	   across	   the	   globe.	  Germany’s	   unconditional	   surrender	   could	  barely	   heal	   the	  millions	   wounded,	   killed,	   and	   murdered,	   the	   millions	   who	   suffered	   unspeakable	  loss—a	  devastation	  of	  humanity	  which	  found	  an	  analogue	  in	  the	  millions	  displaced,	  homeless,	  and	  poverty-­‐stricken	  in	  the	  war’s	  aftermath.	  With	  or	  without	  justification,	  the	   fate	   of	   ethnic	   German	   populations	   was	   especially	   dire,	   humbled	   by	   military	  defeat	  and	  profound	  shame,	  compelled	  to	  cope	  with	  occupied	  cities	  that	  lay	  buried	  in	  rubble.	   It	  comes	  as	  no	  surprise,	   then,	   that	   in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	  Reich’s	  collapse,	  a	  German	  cultural	  heritage,	  especially	  when	  tied	  to	  a	  particular	  territory,	  would	  come	  to	   represent	   a	   considerable	   liability.	   In	   many	   cases,	   this	   cultural	   identity	   hardly	  counted	  as	  personal	  property	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  marker	  of	  a	  racialized,	  all-­‐too-­‐physical	  body.	   With	  tragic	  irony,	  it	  was	  this	  kind	  of	  embodied	  culture	  that	  would	  haunt	  the	  German	   population	   of	   Romania,	   the	   people	   of	   Banat,	   Transylvania	   and	   Bukovina	  who,	  in	  1945,	  were	  singled	  out	  by	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  for	  forced	  labor	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	   war	   reparations.	   Due	   to	   their	   ethnic	   affiliation	   alone,	   tens	   of	   thousands	   of	  German-­‐Romanians,	   regardless	   of	   individual	   responsibility,	   were	   sent	   to	   Russian	  camps	  to	  work	  in	  deadly	  harsh	  conditions.	  Rather	  than	  being	  a	  possession	  willingly	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transported,	   their	   German	   cultural	   heritage	   became	   a	   rationale	   for	   mass	  deportation.	  	  	  In	  her	  recent	  novel,	  Atemschaukel,	  published	  in	  2009,	  the	  year	  she,	  too,	  was	  awarded	   the	   Nobel	   Prize	   for	   Literature,	   Herta	  Müller	   strives	   to	   give	   voice	   to	   this	  terrifying	  experience.	  She	  relates	  the	  story	  of	  Leopold	  Auberg,	  a	  seventeen-­‐year-­‐old	  bound	   for	   the	  camps,	  who	  speaks	   in	   the	   first-­‐person.	  Müller’s	  account	   is	  based	  on	  her	  work	  with	  the	  German-­‐Romanian	  poet,	  Oskar	  Pastior,	  who	  provided	  a	  vast	  array	  of	  details	   from	  his	  own	  traumatic	  experience	   in	  the	  Soviet	  camps.	  The	  book	  opens	  with	  a	  theme	  both	  familiar	  and	  strange:	  	   Alles,	  was	  ich	  habe,	  trage	  ich	  bei	  mir.	  	   Oder:	  Alles	  Meinige	  trage	  ich	  mit	  mir.	  Getragen	  habe	   ich	  alles,	  was	   ich	  hatte.	  Das	  Meinige	  war	  es	  nicht.	  Es	  war	  entweder	  zweckentfremdet	  oder	  von	  jemand	  anderem.	  	  	  	   All	  that	  I	  have	  I	  carry	  on	  me.	  	   Or:	  All	  that	  is	  mine	  I	  carry	  with	  me.	  I	   carried	   everything	   that	   I	   had.	   Mine	   it	   wasn’t.	   It	   was	   either	   repurposed	   or	   from	  someone	  else.15	  	  	  In	  the	  opening	  sentence,	  the	  deported	  narrator	  begins	  by	  observing	  that	  his	  baggage	  amounts	  to	  nothing	  more	  than	  what	  he	  is	  able	  to	  carry.	  And	  as	  the	  novel	  unfolds,	  we	  learn	  how	  this	  poverty	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  protagonist’s	  neediness	  and	  crippling	  hunger.	  	  His	  life	  is	  precarious	  insofar	  as	  it	  is	  entirely	  dependent	  on	  the	  Russian	  wardens	  for	  sustenance.	  With	   the	   second,	   corrective	   sentence—a	   clear	   translation	   of	   the	   Stoic	  
omnia	  mea	  mecum	   porto—the	   narrator	   exhibits	   an	   attempt	   at	   self-­‐fortification,	   a	  desire	   to	   immunize	   himself	   from	   precarity	   by	   transforming	   mere	   baggage	   into	  inalienable	   property.	   Yet,	   this	   dream	   is	   immediately	   exposed	   as	   delusional:	   what	  Leopold	   manages	   to	   take	   along	   with	   him	   to	   the	   labor	   camp	   is	   explicitly	   not	   his	  property.	   Property	   implies	   a	   personal	   proprietor,	   but	   Leopold’s	   personhood,	  reduced	  to	  race,	  has	  fully	  collapsed	  into	  his	  animal,	  impersonal	  being.	  	  For	   his	   journey	   to	   the	   north,	   Leopold’s	   family	   has	   removed	   the	   home’s	  electric	  gramophone	   from	   its	   leather	  case,	   to	  be	  used	  as	  a	  makeshift	   suitcase.	  The	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Herta	  Müller,	  Atemschaukel	  (Frankfurt	  a.	  M.:	  Fischer,	  2009),	  7	  [The	  Hunger	  Angel,	  P.	  Boehm,	  trans.	  (New	  York:	  Picador,	  2012),	  1	  (translation	  modified)].	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privilege	  of	  voice,	  even	  one	  that	  is	  mechanically	  reproduced,	  is	  denied	  him.	  Indeed,	  one	   could	   read	   the	  novel’s	   entire	   first-­‐person	  narrative	   as	   a	  desperate	   struggle	   to	  find	  a	  voice.	  The	  attention	  paid	  to	  physical	  survival,	  to	  the	  preservation	  of	  mere	  life,	  which	   is	   sustained	   throughout	   Müller’s	   account,	   essentially	   reduces	   Leopold	   to	   a	  non-­‐person.	   In	   contrast	   to	   Thomas	   Mann,	   who	   was	   able	   to	   remain	   a	   person	  supported	  by	  his	  cultural	  property,	  Leopold,	  the	  compelled	  laborer	  who	  has	  nothing,	  persists	  as	  a	  non-­‐person	  or	  a	  depersonalized	  subject.	  He	   therefore	   fails	   to	  possess	  language	  entirely,	  finding	  himself	  instead	  possessed	  by	  language:	  Es	  gibt	  Wörter,	  die	  machen	  mit	  mir,	  was	  sie	  wollen.	  Sie	  sind	  ganz	  anders	  als	  ich	  und	  denken	  anders,	  als	  sie	  sind.	  Sie	  fallen	  mir	  ein,	  damit	   ich	  denke,	  es	  gibt	  erste	  Dinge,	  die	  das	  Zweite	  schon	  wollen,	  auch	  wenn	  ich	  gar	  nicht	  will.	  (232)	  	  	  There	  are	  words	  that	  do	  with	  me	  what	  they	  will.	  They	  are	  completely	  different	  from	  me	  and	  think	  differently	  than	  what	  they	  are.	  They	  occur	  to	  me,	  so	  that	  I	  think,	  there	  are	   first	   things	   that	   already	  want	   a	   second	   thing,	   even	  when	   I	  don’t	  want	   it	   at	   all.	  (221;	  modified)	  	  The	   inability	   to	   gain	   cognitive,	   volitional	   control	   over	   language	   is	   symptomatic	   of	  Leopold’s	   precarious	   life—a	   life	   unprotected	   by	   law.	   Even	   before	   his	   internment,	  Leopold’s	   homosexual	   adventures	   marked	   him	   out	   as	   an	   outsider;	   and	   after	   his	  return,	   he	   could	   only	   view	   his	   family’s	   home	   as	   another	   prison.	   Yet,	   rather	   than	  strive	   to	   defend	   himself	   from	   this	   precarity,	   he	   fully	   embraces	   it	   and	   thereby	  discovers	   a	   neutral,	   impersonal	   voice—one	   that	   rejects	   the	   law	   that	   divorces	   a	  sovereign	  person	  from	  a	  subsumed	  body.	  His	  language,	  which	  consists	  in	  listening	  to	  words	   that	   do	  with	   him	  what	   they	  will,	   expresses	   a	   renunciation	   of	   the	   law	   that	  enthrones	   personhood	   by	   separating	   life	   from	   itself.	   Thus,	   he	   initially	   accepts	   his	  deportation,	  which	   he	   prefers	   to	   view	  not	   as	   banishment	   but	   rather	   as	   an	   escape	  from	   a	   home	   that	   was	   never	   his.	   All	   the	   same,	   his	   experience	   in	   the	   labor	   camp	  exposes	  the	  limit	  of	  a	  depersonalized	  life,	  one	  that	  grapples	  with	  a	  subjectivity	  that	  is	   denied	   the	   protection	   of	   personhood;	   as	   Hannah	   Arendt	   would	   express	   it,	   a	  subjectivity	  that	  is	  utterly	  refused	  the	  “right	  to	  have	  rights.”	  	  	   	  Mann,	   Benjamin	   and	   the	   narrator	   of	  Müller’s	   lyrical	   novel	   offer	   reflections	   on	   the	  precarity	  of	   culture	  under	   extreme	   conditions,	   all	   by	  having	   some	   recourse	   to	   the	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Latin	  dictum	  omnia	  mea	  mecum	  porto,	  which	  further	  connects	  the	  fate	  of	  culture	  to	  various	   forms	   of	   subjectivity.	   Thomas	   Mann,	   with	   or	   without	   modesty,	   regards	  himself	   as	   the	   embodiment	   of	   a	   culture	   torn	   from	   the	   territorial	   confines	   of	   the	  nation-­‐state.	  His	  personal	  exile,	  therefore,	  discloses	  the	  fact	  of	  Germany’s	  exile	  from	  Germany.	  Kultur—in	   the	   specific	   German	   sense	   of	  Geisteskultur	  or	  Bildung—must	  find	  a	  new	  home	  within	  the	  space	  of	  American	  culture,	  which	  would	  come	  to	  include,	  at	  least	  in	  Adorno’s	  estimation,	  the	  American	  culture	  industry.16	  For	  Benjamin,	  this	  transportation,	  however	   justified,	  can	  only	  maintain	  a	  rather	  untenable	  concept	  of	  culture.	  The	  wisdom	  of	   the	  Latin	  dictum	  thus	   falls	  apart,	   insofar	  as	   the	  distinction	  between	   intellectual	  and	  material	  possessions	   is	  no	   longer	  operative	   in	   the	   face	  of	  totalitarianism.	  Despite	  the	  initial	  attempt	  to	  re-­‐appropriate	  Stoic	  virtue	  and	  with	  it	  the	  feasibility	  of	  personhood	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  dire	  circumstances,	  Müller’s	  protagonist	  can	   only	   mock	   the	   ideal	   of	   a	   culture	   rendered	   safe	   from	   material	   contingency,	  compelled	   to	   carry	   possessions	   as	   remnants	   of	   a	   culture	   that	   was	   never	   his.	   Yet,	  precisely	  by	  transporting	  and	  transmitting	  only	  what	  he	  has	  but	  can	  never	  own,	  he	  hits	   upon	   a	   unique	   opportunity,	   exposing	   the	   limits	   of	   all	   attempts	   to	   immunize	  oneself	   from	   the	   community	   of	   humans—a	   community	   that	   shares	  what	   is,	   in	   the	  end,	   of	   vital	   importance,	   namely	   the	   vulnerability	   and	   the	   inescapable	   fragility	   of	  our	  mortal	  existence.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Adorno	  reflects	  on	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  German	  sense	  of	  Geisteskultur	  and	  the	  implications	  of	   the	   American	   culture	   industry	   in	   his	   speech	   for	   the	   Hessische	   Hochschulwochen	   für	  staatswissenschaftliche	  Fortbildung	  in	  Bad	  Wildungen,	  July	  9,	  1958:	  “Kultur	  and	  Culture,”	  M.	  Kalbus,	  trans.,	  Social	  Text	  27	  (2009),	  145–58.	  	  
